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PLEADINGS: EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND THE STATE
SECRETS DOCTRINE UNDER THE REYNOLDS FRAMEWORK IN
MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN
Sarah Topy*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1807 case of United States v. Burr, President Thomas Jefferson
accused former Vice President Aaron Burr of committing treason
against the United States.1 Burr was allegedly assembling an army to
try to overtake the South, and was collaborating with foreign nations to
overthrow the U.S. government.2 In preparation for trial, Burr‘s
attorneys requested private correspondence from President Jefferson,
which they claimed was material to their defense. The Supreme Court,
in a decision by Chief Justice Marshall, expressed its opinion on
whether the President could withhold the evidence, stating, ―The
president, although subject to the general rules which apply to others,
may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular paper,
and those motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its
production.‖3 The case signaled the beginning of a common law
doctrine known as the state secrets privilege, a tool that allows the
federal government the ability to prevent disclosure of sensitive
information.
Since its inception in 1807, the state secrets doctrine has been
invoked on numerous occasions, particularly in times of war and on
issues pertaining to national security. 4 Over the years, two different
standards for applying the state secrets doctrine have emerged—one, as
a total bar to any litigation based solely on the subject matter, and the
other, an evidentiary privilege to prohibit select secret materials from
disclosure.
 Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank her family for their support, as well as Professor Michael Solimine, Amanda Szuch, and James
Patrick.
1. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D).
2. Id. at 31.
3. Id.
4. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (―Courts must
act in the interest of the country‘s national security to prevent disclosure of state secrets.‖).
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Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, the use of the state
secrets doctrine has greatly expanded, especially in cases involving
extraordinary rendition—where terror suspects are abducted and
forcibly transported beyond the protection of western laws. Several of
these suspects subsequently brought suit in the U.S. alleging abuse
during their detention. In all of these cases, the federal government has
attempted to use the state secrets doctrine to dismiss the cases at the
outset of the pleading phase.
This Casenote starts with an examination of the background and
scope of the state secrets doctrine, particularly with regard to
extraordinary rendition. Part III examines the Ninth Circuit‘s recent
decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen and how that court applied the
doctrine. Part IV discusses how the standard was misused in Mohamed
and why the suit should have been allowed to continue. Part IV further
discusses whether extraordinary rendition is a program that can even
qualify as a true state secret. Finally, Part V concludes that, based on
the current understanding of the state secrets doctrine under the
Reynolds framework, the Ninth Circuit erred by allowing dismissal on
the pleadings.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE AND
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
A. The State Secrets Doctrine
Courts have acknowledged that rarely, and only when absolutely
necessary, they must act in the interest of national security to prevent the
disclosure of state secrets.5 That means that valid evidence may be
excluded and litigants may even be denied their day in court.6 There are
two ways that courts may apply this principle—(1) under the Totten bar
or (2) under the Reynolds framework. The Totten bar completely bans
adjudication of any kind and does not consider the ramifications of a
dismissal. Cases are simply thrown out at the outset based on subject
matter. Conversely, the Reynolds framework is an evidentiary device
5. Id. at 1077.
6. Id.
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that excludes certain privileged information. The exclusion of this
evidence may eventually prove fatal to the entire suit, but it does not
immediately preclude the case from being adjudicated. Each of the
standards is described below.
1. The Totten Bar
The Supreme Court has stated as a general principle that ―public
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit . . . which would inevitably
lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential.‖7 In the 1876 case of Totten v. U.S., a former spy during
the Civil War brought suit against the federal government for failing to
compensate him for his services.8 Concluding that the very existence of
such a relationship was ―the kind of fact itself not to be disclosed,‖ the
Court dismissed the suit at the outset and allowed no further
proceedings.9
The Totten bar was recently affirmed in Tenet v. U.S., a Supreme
Court case involving Cold War spies who accused the CIA of reneging
on a contract to pay for their espionage services.10 Reiterating that the
Totten bar is ―designed not merely to defeat asserted claims, but to
preclude judicial inquiry entirely,‖ the Court dismissed the case at the
outset.11
Whether or not the Supreme Court has ever used the Totten bar in any
other case is a matter of some debate. In its decision in Mohamed v.
Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court invoked the
Totten bar in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education
Project.12 There, a group of environmentalists sued the United States
Navy for failing to comply with a requirement to produce environmental
impact reports.13 While the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed cited that the
Supreme Court used language from Totten in its dismissal, the Court
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 107.
Tenet v. United States, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 6.
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
Id. at 141.
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only referenced Totten in dicta, and dismissed the case on other
grounds.14
While the Supreme Court has never articulated an actual rule for
when the Totten bar is appropriate, it has only definitively invoked it in
espionage cases.15 As a district court recently noted in Hepting v. AT&T
Corporation, a consequence of spies entering into contracts with the
United States is an implicit waiver of their rights to litigate because they
knew that the government could never publicly avow the relationship.16
Further, while the scope of the Totten bar is unclear, what is clear is
that it is rarely invoked. And because of the harsh consequences
associated with it, courts are dissuaded from using Totten and are
instead encouraged to evaluate state secret claims under the more
nuanced Reynolds framework.17 Particularly because the state secrets
doctrine is entirely judge-made common law, courts are generally
reluctant to end suits at the outset without trying to parse out privileged
information from non-privileged information. The Reynolds framework
is the favored test with which to conduct a state secrets analysis.
2. The Reynolds Evidentiary Framework
Unlike the Totten bar, which completely ends the litigation, the
Reynolds framework is the more common and less severe application of
the state secrets doctrine.18 In U.S. v. Reynolds, spouses of civilians
killed in an Air Force plane crash sued under the Federal Torts Claims
Act. The Court held that while some evidence may be excluded under
the state secrets doctrine, the case as a whole would proceeded without
the offending evidence.19 In Reynolds, the United States attempted to
14. Id. at 142 (finding that the Navy was not required to prepare these reports because Congress
excluded them under the Freedom of Information Act, and the reports in this case were hypothetical and
not based on actual environmental impact; therefore, the Court‘s holding did not involve the state secrets
privilege).
15. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that
the Totten bar has never been clearly defined).
16. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
17. See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1084 (noting the harsh consequences of Totten and the rarity
with which it should be applied).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
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utilize the state secrets doctrine to end the litigation at the outset. The
government claimed that the sensitive documents requested by plaintiffs
were privileged, and therefore, the government was protected from
disclosure.20 The suit was permitted to proceed because although the
documents were secret and could be withheld, they had little bearing on
the merits of the claim. The Court created a new framework for
evaluating state secrets that considered the specific evidence rather than
the nature of the case itself.21
In subsequent decisions since Reynolds, courts have developed a
three-part test for the proper invocation of state secrets under this
framework.22 First, the defendant must satisfy certain procedural
requirements.23 Second, courts must determine if the information is
indeed privileged.24 Finally, and only if the claim of privilege is
successful, courts must decide how to proceed in light of that claim.25
For the procedural requirements to be satisfied, a director of a
governmental agency—and not a subordinate—must invoke the doctrine
and personally explain why the information must be kept secret.26 The
privilege is limited to government officials and is not available to
private parties.27 If the procedural requirements are satisfied, the court
will examine the information to determine if the information is truly a
secret.28 If the court determines that it is, then it has to determine how to
proceed while making every attempt to separate out the privileged
information from the non-privileged information so that the suit can
proceed.
If the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case without the privileged

20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. (holding that the Air Force‘s plans and blueprints had no bearing on whether faulty
engineering and mechanics contributed to the crash).
22. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted) (outlining the three-part test).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1080.
27. Id. In cases where the government intervenes and then moves for dismissal, the government
official can assert the privilege on behalf of itself and other defendants.
28. In camera investigations allow for the courts to review sensitive information that the public
cannot access before determining its admissibility in open court.
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evidence, then the suit is dismissed.29 Similarly, if the defendant is
denied an opportunity to present a valid defense because doing so would
invoke the privileged information, the suit is also dismissed.30
Some courts have added a third consideration, holding that if the
privileged information is so closely related to the non-privileged, a suit
can be dismissed because of the unacceptable risk of disclosure of state
secrets.31 The court can dismiss the suit if the potential for disclosure is
too significant, even when the plaintiff and defendant are able to
establish their initial arguments using non-privileged information.32
Unlike the Totten bar, which dismisses the suit without considering
the other parties‘ interests, the Reynolds framework is a balancing test.
Under Reynolds, courts examine the government‘s claim of privilege
critically, without mere acceptance, while still offering great deference
to the government‘s claim of national security. 33 Because Reynolds‘s
flexibility often allows the case to proceed after certain evidence or
particular claims are removed, it is the standard that courts most often
invoke as it does not deny litigants their day in court. From a public
policy standpoint, courts have noted the state secrets doctrine is a judgemade common law doctrine, and less harsh consequences to litigants is a
more favored approach.
B. The State Secrets Doctrine in Post 9/11 Cases
The federal government has asserted the state secrets doctrine in a
series of recent cases following the attacks on September 11. Since the
attacks, the government has become more aggressive in the war on
terror. In response to this aggressive approach, plaintiffs have brought
suits alleging various violations, which the government has attempted to
quash by citing the state secrets privilege. In two recent cases, plaintiffs
alleged that the government secretly recorded private conversations in
violation of wiretapping statutes.
29. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080–83 (9th Cir. 2010)
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1083 (holding that proceeding with a case would be ―an unacceptable risk of disclosing
state secrets‖).
33. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
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In In re Sealed Case, a former Drug Enforcement Agency official
accused his bosses of secretly wiretapping his conversations to build
evidence against him in order to fire him.34 Citing the national security
interests surrounding the case and the need to protect the identities of
CIA operatives, the government moved for dismissal under the state
secrets doctrine.35 The district court initially granted the dismissal, but
the appeals court for the District of Columbia reversed. The appellate
court found that although there was some privileged information, the
plaintiff could establish a prima facie case using non-privileged
information, as stipulated by the Reynolds framework.36 One reason the
court refused to dismiss the suit was because the CIA provided no
concrete answer as to why the case could not proceed. The court
refused to rely on a merely hypothetical defense.37 The court went on to
hold, ―Where the United States has sufficient grounds to invoke the state
secrets privilege, allowing the mere prospect of a privileged defense to
thwart a citizen‘s efforts to vindicate his constitutional rights would run
afoul of the Supreme Court‘s caution [in these cases].‖38
More recently, in Hepting, the plaintiffs initiated a class action suit
and sued the government and AT&T alleging that AT&T was providing
structural support for the government‘s illegal wiretapping program.39
Employees at AT&T testified that the company had worked with the
government to build a supercomputer for the purpose of spying on
private conversations on the phone and the Internet.40 The government,
representing itself and AT&T, moved to dismiss the entire suit under
either Totten or Reynolds.41 In denying that request, the court held that
because President Bush and other government officials had publicly
acknowledged the wiretapping program and confirmed AT&T‘s role in
the program, the government had opened the door for precisely the type

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 149–150.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Id.
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of suit that plaintiffs brought.42
Both In re Sealed Case and Hepting acknowledged that when the
subject matter is not itself a state secret, dismissal on the pleadings is
often inappropriate.
1. El-Masri v. U.S.: The First Extraordinary Rendition Case
Some of the most recent cases concerning the government‘s claim of
the state secrets doctrine deal with its program of extraordinary
rendition—a program designed to interrogate alleged terror suspects in
countries that do not abide by U.S. or international law.43 Extraordinary
rendition allows for the transfer of these suspects to locales where there
are far fewer restrictions on the types of interrogation methods that can
be used to extract information from them, which can then be used in the
war on terror.44
The first extraordinary rendition case tried in American courts was
the Fourth Circuit‘s 2007 decision in El-Masri v. United States.45 In this
case, El-Masri, a German citizen, accused former CIA Director George
Tenet, various CIA officers, and several private companies of
committing tortuous acts under the Alien Tort Statute after they
allegedly arranged for El-Masri‘s kidnapping and detention in
Macedonia.46 El-Masri claimed that he was secretly flown to that
country, interrogated, beaten, blindfolded, and prohibited from
communicating with others.
Upon El-Masri‘s release—allegedly
granted because U.S. operatives admitted to ―having the wrong man‖—
he brought suit against both private and public officials.47 El-Masri
advanced two arguments that were ultimately rejected: (1) that
extraordinary rendition is not a state secret and (2) that even if the state
secrets doctrine applied, the court should not dismiss the entire suit at
the outset before discovery could even occur. El-Masri argued that it
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining the
extraordinary rendition program).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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was possible to separate out privileged information from non-privileged
information.48
The Fourth Circuit rejected El-Masri‘s arguments, despite
acknowledging that the press had revealed some details on the
extraordinary rendition program and despite a report issued by the
British government detailing the U.S. involvement in the program.49
The court upheld the dismissal even before responsive pleadings from
the defendants were filed and before any discovery was permitted.50
In ruling that the district court was correct in granting the
government‘s motion to dismiss at the outset, the Fourth Circuit
examined the case. The court concluded that the very subject matter of
the suit and the central facts needed to litigate it were so closely
connected to the offending state secrets that dismissal was proper. 51 The
court continued, stating, ―Dismissal at the pleading stage is appropriate
if state secrets are so central to a proceeding that it cannot be litigated
without threatening their disclosure.‖52 Said another way, the Fourth
Circuit required more than the plaintiff‘s ability to make a prima facie
case with non-privileged evidence; the court required the plaintiff to
establish that litigation could proceed, beyond a prima facie case,
without the use of privileged evidence. Because the court determined
that such a case could not be made without the offending evidence,
dismissal was appropriate even at the pleading stage.53
Further, the court stated that though public information had been
revealed through the media about the extraordinary rendition program,
that alone was insufficient to no longer classify extraordinary rendition
as a state secret.54 When El-Masri argued that he could make his claims
with only publicly circulated information, the court again rejected his
arguments claiming that even if El-Masri could establish his case, the

48. Id. at 302.
49. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2007).
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 308.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 308–309 (asserting that though the press was aware of El-Masri‘s ordeal, ―[A]dvancing
a case in the court of public opinion, against the United States at large, is an undertaking quite different
from prevailing against specific defendants in a court of law.‖).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6

246

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

defendants would require the privileged information as part of any valid
defense they would raise.55
For two years, El-Masri was the only extraordinary rendition case on
file until plaintiffs alleging they were tortured recently brought suit in
the Ninth Circuit.
III. MOHAMED V. JEPPESEN
In Mohamed v Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the most recent
case of extraordinary rendition. In a 6–5 decision, the court chose to
grant the U.S. government‘s motion to dismiss at the pleading stage
based on the state secrets doctrine.56
In Mohamed, five foreign-born men sued in federal court claiming
that they were victims of the extraordinary rendition program. 57 While
the plaintiffs were from different countries and were transferred to
different locations, each recounted a similar story of being arrested,
transferred to American custody, forcibly transferred to another country,
and tortured in various ways.58 The plaintiffs alleged that they were
beaten, subjected to shock therapy, held without the ability to contact
their families or legal counsel, and forced to endure inhumane living
conditions. The detainees also alleged that they were bound and
gagged, and were kept in almost total darkness.59 In all cases, they were
eventually released and returned to their home countries.60
Instead of suing the government, as the plaintiffs had in El-Masri, the
plaintiffs in Mohamed sued Jeppesen Dataplan Incorporated (Jeppesen)
under the Alien Tort Act, alleging forced disappearance, torture, and
various First Amendment violations.61
A subsidiary of Boeing
Corporation, Jeppesen is a transportation and airline company that,
according to the plaintiffs, arranged the flights that sent the alleged

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308–309 (4th Cir. 2007).
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1074–1075.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
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victims to the countries where they were allegedly tortured.62 The
plaintiffs argued that Jeppesen knew or should have known its actions
were facilitating torture, and that it intentionally falsified flight plans to
avoid public scrutiny.63 After the suit had been brought in district court,
the U.S. government intervened, and argued that the case should be
dismissed, relying on the state secrets privilege.64 The government
reasoned that any case on extraordinary rendition would involve
national security details that could not be exposed. After allowing the
government‘s intervention, the district court granted the motion to
dismiss under the state secrets doctrine, but it did so under the Totten
bar. The government argued that the very subject matter was forbidden
from suit, rather than arguing the Reynolds evidentiary framework,
which would have allowed the case to proceed.65
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel reversed the
district court‘s decision, holding that the government had failed to
establish a basis for dismissal under the state secrets doctrine.66
However, the Ninth Circuit decided to review the case en banc and
eventually ruled to reinstate the district court‘s motion to dismiss. 67
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of whether to
apply the Totten or the Reynolds bar to review the government‘s use of
the state secrets doctrine.68 The court concluded that while the Totten
bar may not be as narrow as the plaintiffs would argue, the Reynolds
framework was the more appropriate in this case.69 After establishing
that the first two criteria of the Reynolds test were satisfied—(1) the
government properly invoked the privilege and (2) the information
presented was a state secret—the court was left with the third prong of
the Reynolds framework—to evaluate how the case should proceed in

62. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010).
63. Id.
64. Id. Significantly, the government advanced its state secret argument under both the Totten
and Reynolds frameworks. Id.
65. Id. at 1077; see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
66. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1084.
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light of the offending state secrets.70
The first rule of law the court acknowledged was that, wherever
possible, secret information should be walled off from non-secret
information, and the suit should proceed without that evidence.71
However, where the information between secret and non-secret evidence
is so closely connected that the suit cannot continue for fear of
revelation, then courts can dismiss the entire case at the outset.72
Acknowledging that dismissing the entire suit is within the purview of
Totten and that the Ninth Circuit rejected other decisions conflating the
two standards, the majority nonetheless concluded that they operate on a
continuum. The court held, therefore, that it is possible for the Reynolds
framework to reach the same practical conclusion as Totten: dismissal
on the pleadings.73
The Ninth Circuit pre-empted the dissent‘s argument and stressed in
its decision that this dismissal may occur as early as the pleadings, even
before an answer is offered or before discovery begins.74 The court
concluded that because there was an unjustifiable risk that state secrets
may be exposed, there was no reason to be reckless and push things to
the limit to allow cases to proceed when it is clear that they are
sufficiently reliant on state secrets.75 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit
conceded that the government‘s extraordinary rendition program is not a
pure state secret and that the plaintiffs may well be able to establish a
prima facie case based on the public records evidence it procured.76
However, the court found the dismissal at the pleading stage a proper
decision because the defense may have had to use state secrets in order
to defend itself, creating a potential for harm from future litigation,.77
Finally, the court pointed out several other remedies that may offer
70. Id. at 1086.
71. Id. (reiterating that ―[W]henever possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter.‘‖).
72. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2010); see also ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007).
73. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089 (agreeing that Reynolds, unlike Totten, does not support
dismissal based on the subject matter yet ultimately dismissal may still be appropriate).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1083.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id.
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redress, including Congressional action preventing future use of
extraordinary rendition or the President admitting wrongdoing and
offering reparations to victims.78
In a vigorous dissent, five justices argued that, like the Fourth Circuit
in El-Masri, the majority was conflating the Totten bar and the Reynolds
framework.79 Reiterating that Reynolds is solely an evidentiary
privilege and should be used only to suppress offending evidence and
not to excise entire claims, the dissent argued that the majority
misapplied Reynolds.80 First, the dissent reasoned that since the court
was considering a Rule 12 motion for dismissal, the court‘s job was
merely to assess whether the plaintiff had maintained a cause of action
for which relief can be granted. The court‘s job was not, according to
the dissent, to consider the merits of the litigation or to decide potential
issues associated with future litigation.81 Next, the dissent explained
that the defense‘s filing of a Rule 8(b)(6) motion to refuse an answer
was meant to apply only to specific requests for information and not, as
the majority argued, meant to prevent the government from filing an
answer altogether.82 Where a defendant cannot answer part of a
complaint because of evidentiary rules, the defendant must still address
the parts of the complaint that are answerable so that the suit can
proceed.83 If the majority was correct—that the defendants could excise
entire allegations at the outset—the Reynolds privilege would become
an immunity doctrine.84 For that reason, the dissent was not convinced
that there is ever a case where, under Reynolds, the entire suit could be
dismissed at the pleadings.85
Finally, the dissent argued that because of the significant
constitutional claims at stake in this case, the priority that courts place
on due process, and the importance of checks and balances, the court
78. Id. at 1091.
79. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. at 1093–1094.
81. Id. at 1100.
82. Id. at 1098.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1099 n.12 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J.,
dissenting).
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should grant litigants their day in court and not dismiss entire suits.86
The dissent, like the majority, readily agreed that certain aspects of
Mohamed may concern state secrets and may be prohibited because of
the state secrets doctrine. The dissent, however, argued that the case
should be remanded to the district court for the defendants to file an
answer to determine if the case could proceed.87
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Ninth Circuit Conflated the Totten and Reynolds Standards and
Failed to Recognize That Extraordinary Rendition’s “Very Subject
Matter” Is Not a State Secret.
The Ninth Circuit‘s first error in dismissing Mohamed at the pleading
phase was, ironically, something that the court had previously criticized
about the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in El-Masri. Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit erred by conflating the Totten total bar on litigation standard
with the more nuanced Reynolds evidentiary framework.88
The U.S. Supreme Court was clear in Totten that dismissal of an
entire suit at the outset should occur only when the very subject matter
of the case is itself a state secret.89 If the subject matter is not a state
secret, then courts are to use the Reynolds framework, which merely
prohibits the introduction of privileged evidence.90 If the plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case or the defense is denied critical
evidence without the offending information, then dismissal of the suit
may be appropriate.91 But Reynolds, by its own assertion, is an
evidentiary test and is not an immunity doctrine.92
As the Ninth Circuit conceded in Mohamed, the extraordinary

86. Id. at 1101.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1087 n.12 (explaining how the court conceded it had objected to El-Masri in a previous
decision because of its overbroad interpretation of the ―very subject matter‖ analysis).
89. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
90. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).
91. See id. at 1083.
92. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
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rendition program is not a state secret.93 However, the court reasoned
that even under Reynolds, the government could prevail on its state
secret argument to dismiss at the pleadings.94 By explaining that even
though some aspects of the program were known, there was too great a
risk of disclosure of those secret elements if the suit proceeded to
litigation, the Ninth Circuit applied the Totten bar to a Reynolds
question.
This application is inappropriate for several reasons, and was
disavowed by the Ninth Circuit itself just two years before it decided
Mohamed.95
1. Extraordinary Rendition Is Not a State Secret and Sufficient
Information About the Program Already Existed in the Public Realm to
Allow the Suit to Commence.
First, while it may be true in other contexts that the potential
disclosure of state secrets is too great to allow a suit to commence
because of the state secrets doctrine, the breadth and depth of coverage
on the extraordinary rendition program is so significant that it is difficult
to see why dismissal on the pleadings was necessary here. 96 The
extraordinary rendition program has been publicly acknowledged by the
President of the United States, high-ranking members of the U.S.
government, the governments of other nations, and countless media and
news organizations.97
The New Yorker magazine first exposed the extraordinary rendition
program in a scathing 2006 article, in which a British journalist exposed
93. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1090 ―[The court] do[es] not hold that the existence of the
extraordinary rendition program is itself a state secret.‖).
94. Id.
95. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering a
state secrets case just two years prior to Mohamed and disagreeing with too expansive a reading of the
state secrets privilege that allowed for outright dismissal at the pleadings).
96. As this Casenote observes, the dissent in Mohamed prepared a 1,800 page appendix of public
records and documents that highlights the information already available concerning extraordinary
rendition.
97. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have acknowledged U.S. participation
in the program, as have other top officials in U.S. government, including current Attorney General Eric
Holder who supplied the memo invoking the state secret privilege in Mohamed.
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alleged torture practices detailed in top-secret documents obtained from
the Spanish government, which described the rendition flights.98 That
journalist, Stephen Gray, wrote a book called ―Ghost Plane,‖ which
detailed El-Masri‘s allegations. Gray‘s book also included information
alleging that then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ordered ElMasri‘s release when the government discovered that they had
imprisoned the wrong man.99
Following the Fourth Circuit‘s ruling in El-Masri and concerns from
civil rights organizations that the U.S. was sanctioning torture, Congress
initiated two years of hearings on the extraordinary rendition
program.100 In April 2007, two House foreign affairs committees held a
joint hearing on the legality of extraordinary rendition. The hearing
featured heated exchanges among Congressmen opposed to the practice,
members of the CIA, and other intelligence experts who vehemently—
and in great detail—defended the program‘s merits.101 After learning
more about extraordinary rendition, Congressman Bill Delhaunt
remarked, ―These renditions not only appear to violate our obligations
under the UN Convention Against Torture and other international
treaties, but they have undermined our very commitment to fundamental
American values.‖102 That same year, Senator Joe Biden of Delaware
introduced legislation to prohibit rendition.103
During the 2009 opening arguments in front of the Ninth Circuit,
Mohamed‘s attorneys argued that there were no state secrets left to
protect. In support, Mohamed‘s attorneys cited to the fact that the
government had declassified thousands of pages of information about
interrogation techniques. Mohamed‘s attorneys also explained that all
other nations involved in extraordinary rendition had acknowledged
98. Jane Mayer, The CIA’s Travel Agent, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer (citing El-Masri‘s case and
including an interview with Jeppesen about its involvement in the extraordinary rendition program).
99. Id.
100. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Couterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic
Relations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt).
103. In 2007, following these hearings, Senator Biden introduced the National Security with
Justice Act of 2007. This act would have significantly curbed the use of extraordinary rendition and
would have required strict constraints on who is deemed an enemy combatant.
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their role in it.104 Additionally, in 2010 the New York Times conducted
an open and on-the-record interview with officials from the Obama
Administration, who defended extraordinary rendition and explained its
benefits.105
In sum, the amount of information—including Congressional
hearings presented on the public record—that has emerged in just two
years since the decision in El-Masri changes the dynamics of the
extraordinary rendition debate. The amount of information makes it
clear that extraordinary rendition is not a state secret. Further, there is
nothing so inherently secretive about extraordinary rendetion that should
allow for dismissal of litigation on the pleadings.
This is the same logic that the D.C. Court of Appeals applied recently
in its decision in Hepting v. AT&T.106 The court in Hepting conducted a
long and detailed factual analysis of the government‘s wiretapping
program, and concluded that the public knowledge of the program was
so pervasive that its very subject matter could no longer be considered a
state secret.107
As evidence that the subject matter in Hepting was not a state secret,
the court drew on similar information that the dissent in Mohamed
highlighted: the fact that the President of the United States had
acknowledged the program, that major media outlets had reported on the
program, that high-level government officials had commented on the
program, and that Congress had investigated the merits of the
program.108
With all of that information, the court determined that the subject
matter of the case did not require dismissal on the pleadings and elected
to return the issue to the district court to determine if the plaintiff could
104. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010).
105. John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed., More Continuity Than Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15iht-edbellinger.html.
106. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
107. Id. at 986. Specifically, the court cites two reports—a New York Times article and a radio
address by former President George W. Bush—that exposed sufficient details about the wiretapping
program so that it was no longer a state secret. Id. The court determined that because the government
had already admitted to the basic ―contours‖ of the wiretapping program, exclusion of states secrets was
unnecessary. Id. This argument is clearly applicable to the extraordinary rendition program as
described in Mohamed.
108. Id.
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establish a prima facie case against the government.109
Perhaps most significantly, the Hepting court distinguished the
subject matter of illegal wiretapping with the extraordinary rendition
program that had recently been found to be a state secret by the Fourth
Circuit in El-Masri.110 The Hepting court looked to El-Masri and
concluded that the court was correct in dismissing El-Masri at the
outset, based on the pleadings, because there was only ―limited sketches
of the alleged program [that] had been disclosed.‖ Additionally, the
issue in El-Masri concerned the existence of extraordinary rendition and
whether the government was involved in it.111 However, as outlined
above, because of the years that elapsed between the Fourth Circuit‘s
decision in El-Masri and the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Mohamed,
sufficient information about the extraordinary rendition program has
come to light to negate many of the concerns over the secretive nature of
the program. Indeed, there is no question anymore as to whether the
government is involved in the program, only whether the government
was illegally torturing people.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit would have been correct to apply the
same test that the D.C. Court of Appeals did in Hepting—determining
that because the subject matter was not a state secret, dismissal at the
outset was inappropriate, and remanding to the district court as the trier
of fact to discern whether the case could proceed.
2. As the Ninth Circuit Noted, If the Subject Matter Is Not a State
Secret, Then Allowing Dismissal on the Pleadings Misapplies the
Reynolds Test
Two years prior to Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit in Al-Haramain v.
U.S. clearly held that the state secrets doctrine under the Reynolds
analysis should not allow dismissal on the pleadings.112
After learning that its phones had been illegally wiretapped, AlHaramain, a charitable organization, sued the government for violating
its Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 994.
Id. at 984–985.
Id. at 994.
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
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from the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in El-Masri by allowing the claims to
proceed even though certain evidence had to be excluded from the case.
Whereas the Fourth Circuit concluded that ―for purposes of the state
secrets analysis, the ‗central facts‘ and ‗very subject matter‘ of an action
are those facts that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending
against it,‘‖ the Ninth Circuit did not necessarily view those two
concepts as one and the same. Said differently, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Fourth Circuit‘s holding that the ―very subject matter‖ test
was dispositive as to whether the plaintiff could establish a prima facie
case.113 The Ninth Circuit distinguished its decision from cases that
must be dismissed at the very outset because of their subject matter and
cases in which the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case absent the
challenged material.114 Dismissal at the outset, the court reasoned, was
an overbroad reading of the state secrets doctrine when (1) the plaintiff
is able to present a case using admissible facts and (2) the subject matter
is not banned under Totten. Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit
misapplied the Reynolds test to Mohamed and allowed the case to be
dismissed prematurely.
B. The Reynolds Framework Is an Evidentiary Privilege and Should
Prevent Dismissal of an Entire Suit When the Plaintiff Can Establish a
Prima Facie Case and the Defendant Has not Even Submitted an
Answer.
Having established that extraordinary rendition in general is not, by
its very subject matter, a state secret, it is clear that the Totten bar to
litigation was the incorrect standard to utilize in Mohamed. The Ninth
Circuit‘s error was not in applying Reynolds, but in conflating the two
standards and allowing an evidentiary privilege to dismiss an entire suit
at the pleadings before the defendant even filed an answer.
As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Reynolds, the test over
whether to allow the admittance of evidence is if ―there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters

113. Id. at 1201–1202 (distinguishing El-Masri from Al-Haramain).
114. Id.
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which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.‖ 115 If,
after the evidentiary privilege is properly asserted and the offending
information is excised, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case,
then dismissal at the pleadings may be appropriate. However, if that is
not the situation, then the Reynolds test, like all other rules of evidence,
is merely a tool for courts to discern how a case should proceed. The
general rule under the Reynolds framework is that, where possible,
privileged information should be separated out from non-privileged
information and the case should proceed.116 Because this is the goal of
the Reynolds framework, and because granting due process to litigants is
such a fundamental right, courts should afford plaintiffs every
opportunity to overcome evidentiary hurdles.
The dissent in Mohamed correctly observed that even if the state
secrets privilege can be asserted as early as the pleadings stage, the
privilege allows defendants to utilize only Rule 8(b)(6) motions to
restrict their answers. Importantly, the dissent noted that nothing in the
Reynolds test, or the rules of evidence generally, allows an evidentiary
privilege to expand into an immunity doctrine. As the Supreme Court
observed in Reynolds, the state secrets privilege ―has long been
established in the law of evidence‖ and is meant to be applied as other
evidentiary precautions are, and no broader than that.
The plaintiff in Mohamed acknowledged and stipulated that there may
be certain pieces of evidence that would be prohibited from admittance
based on the state secrets privilege. But that evidence should be
considered on a piece-by-piece basis, and at the very least, the defendant
should have to file an answer and disclose which evidence the defendant
would be unable to produce.117
However, the majority in Mohamed rejected both the dissent‘s
argument that an evidentiary privilege is not intended to excise entire
claims and the plaintiffs‘ plea to wait until further in the litigation to
determine if the suit could proceed. In reaching this conclusion, the
majority relied on two cases that, under the Reynolds framework,
dismissed entire suits without allowing them to proceed. However, the

115. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
116. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2010).
117. Id. at 1072.
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similarities between Mohamed and those two cases are tenuous at best,
making the two cases not readily applicable.
The first case that the majority cited was its own precedent, Kasza v.
Browner. In that decision, plaintiffs were former workers at an Air
Force base who sued the Air Force and the United States government for
violating certain health and safety standards.118 Because the defendants
asserted the state secrets privilege at the pleadings and, when fully
examined, ―the mosaic of privileged and non-privileged information
together‖ was sufficient for the dismissal of the litigation, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Mohamed followed Kasza, and should allow for
outright dismissal.119
However, there are two important distinctions between Mohamed and
Kasza, which the majority failed to consider. First, Kasza permitted the
case to proceed and required the government to file a response before
rendering its decision.120 It was not until later, after discovery
commenced and the court considered each piece of evidence separately,
that the Ninth Circuit concluded that much of the information the
plaintiffs requested would be barred by the evidentiary privilege of the
state secrets doctrine. In Mohamed, the plaintiff argued that the timing
of the dismissal in his case was inappropriate and that he could establish
his case without asking for offending evidence in discovery. That
Mohamed never received that opportunity while the plaintiffs in Kasza
did is a major difference between the two cases.
Second, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning for dismissing Kasza differed
greatly from its reasoning for dismissing Mohamed. After the excluded
evidence was prohibited in Kasza, there was no information left for the
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case. Additionally, the court later
determined that the very subject matter in Kasza was a state secret,
which precluded further judicial inquiry entirely. These two factors—
(1) that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case without the
offending evidence and (2) that the very subject matter was a state
secret—are absent in Mohamed. In Mohamed, the court assumed,
arguendo, that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case. The court

118. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 1170.
120. Id. at 1164.
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also acknowledged the thousands of public records that the plaintiff had
procured to mount a complaint. Additionally, the court clearly stated
that extraordinary rendition as a subject matter is simply not a state
secret.
The Ninth Circuit next considered Black v. U.S. as proof that
dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate under the Reynolds evidentiary
privilege.121 In Black, the plaintiff, an electrical engineer who worked
for the government and the CIA, brought federal tort and Bivens actions
against the government for psychological and physical damage he
allegedly received after they learned of an encounter he had with a
Soviet.122 Similar to Kasza, the Eighth Circuit allowed the suit to
proceed until discovery. During discovery, the court determined that the
suit must be dismissed due to the plaintiff‘s failure to prove a prima
facie case without the offending evidence. As stated above, Mohamed is
distinguishable from Black in that the plaintiff in Mohamed met his
prima facie burden and the defendants were at least required to submit
an answer. Therefore, because both Kasza and Black present such stark
and significant differences from the conclusions reached in Mohamed,
the cases were inapplicable in Mohamed.
In considering how the Reynolds evidentiary framework should be
utilized in cases concerning state secret privileges, the Ninth Circuit
should have considered the following two cases from the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The first case, Ellsberg v. Mitchell, involved plaintiffs alleging that
they were victims of warrantless wiretapping authorized by the
government and the CIA.123 The plaintiffs in Ellsberg, who were
defendants in a related criminal case, filed interrogatories and requested
discovery from various governmental organizations about the extent and
scope of the wiretapping.124 When the government asserted the state

121. Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.1995).
122. Bivens actions allow for damage remedies for constitutional violations committed by federal
agents.
123. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The plaintiffs in were defendants in the
famous ―Pentagon papers‖ case, where Daniel Ellsberg and other defendants were accused of illegally
releasing confidential information about the Vietnam War to the media and other public organizations.
Id. at 52.
124. Id.
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secrets privilege exempted it from disclosing the information, the district
court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.125 However, in an
important and oft-cited opinion on the state secrets doctrine, the D.C.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision. According to the appellate
court, if the Totten test was inapplicable, the Reynolds evidentiary
privilege was insufficient to permit excising entire claims. Therefore,
the court ruled that dismissing the entire suit was not appropriate.126
The court of appeals further explained that, under Reynolds, privileged
information is merely to be treated ―as though a witness had died, and
the case will proceed with no consequences save those resulting from
the loss of the evidence.‖127 The state secrets privilege, the court
concluded, does not allow for the outright dismissal of the suit without
consideration of the evidence—a rule that the D.C. court affirmed only
recently.128
In a 2005 case, Crater Corp. v. Lucent, Crater sued Lucent
Technologies for breaching patent permissions when Lucent unveiled a
―coupling device‖ that Crater alleged it had already developed. 129 The
U.S. government reportedly utilized this technology for its illegal
wiretapping program. When Crater brought suit, the government
intervened, asserting the state secrets privilege at the pleadings to
prevent disclosures about this device from surfacing.130 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court‘s grant of the
government‘s motion to dismiss, holding that the motion was not ripe
for consideration until discovery could be conducted.131 The court of
appeals described the district court‘s action as ―putting the cart before
the horse,‖ and despite acknowledging that some evidence would clearly
be protected by the state secrets doctrine, the appellate court remanded
the case for a much more thorough examination of the evidence.132
125. Id. at 64.
126. Id. at 62.
127. Id. at 64.
128. See Crater Corp. v. Lucent, 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
129. Id. at 1263.
130. Id. (noting that the U.S. objected to any discovery that would reveal the development or
usage of the coupling device).
131. Id. at 1268.
132. Id. (concluding that further proceedings were required to determine if sufficient nonprivileged evidence existed to allow the suit to continue.)
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Ellsberg and Crater, therefore, stand for the proposition that even
when the state secrets doctrine is properly invoked, the evidence must be
examined piece by piece to determine how the case should proceed.
Treating offending evidence like a witness who has died, and preventing
courts from prematurely dismissing suits involving state secrets, is,
according to these decisions, precisely what Reynolds hoped to achieve.
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that (1) the Reynolds test is an
evidentiary privilege, and evidentiary privileges are not immunity
doctrines; (2) whenever possible, courts should attempt to separate out
privileged information from non-privileged information so that the case
can proceed; (3) the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied Kasza and Black
to its analysis; and (4) two significant state secrets cases not considered
by the Ninth Circuit more aptly compare to Mohamed. While the
plaintiff in Mohamed conceded that some information in his case may
be privileged, the Ninth Circuit erred in its understanding of the
Reynolds evidentiary test. This misunderstanding led to dismissal of the
entire suit at the pleadings before a detailed analysis of the evidence
could occur.
C. The Ninth Circuit Incorrectly Allowed the Assertion of a Hypothetical
Defense Instead of Requiring Jeppesen to Assert a Valid Defense.
Courts agree that when analyzing a state secrets doctrine issue, it is
not enough to consider the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case; courts must also consider whether
defendants can assert a valid defense.133 If defendants cannot assert a
valid defense without the secret evidence, courts may properly dismiss
entire suits at the pleadings.134 A ―valid defense‖ must be legally
sufficient and meritorious.135 For this reason, the Ninth Circuit erred by
granting the defendant‘s motion to dismiss not based on any valid
defense but on the proposition of a valid defense, which was never
actually asserted.
Before the Ninth Circuit decided Mohamed en banc, a three-judge

133. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
134. Id.
135. Id. (defining ―meritorious‖ as meriting a legal victory).
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panel on the court of appeals ruled to overturn the district court and
allow the case to proceed.136 That three-judge panel acknowledged that
the issue of state secrets may surface in the case and may prevent the
defendants from asserting a valid defense.137 The panel concluded,
however, that the government‘s arguments were premature, and the
lower court should not evaluate ―hypothetical claims‖ that had not yet
been introduced.138
The government‘s attempt to rely on hypothetical defenses was
explicitly rejected by the three-judge panel. Even though this position
was later overturned en banc, it has support. It is the law in the D.C.
Circuit as articulated in In re Sealed Case. There, a Drug Enforcement
Agency officer who worked in Burma sued the State Department in a
Bivens action. The officer alleged that he was harassed and spied on
because his superior, an unnamed CIA agent, had a vendetta against
him.139 The officer further alleged that his phones were illegally
wiretapped, that conversations he had with his subordinates were taken
out of context, and that he was repeatedly threatened and intimidated.140
The State Department and CIA argued that they could not answer
plaintiff‘s complaint because of the state secrets privilege—an argument
that the D.C. Court of Appeals emphatically rejected.
The court of appeals reasoned that while there were possible defenses
that the government could raise that would involve state secrets, none
had actually been raised. As the court went on to conclude:
Were the valid defense exception expanded to mandate dismissal of a
complaint for any plausible or colorable defense, then virtually every case
in which the United States successfully invokes the state secrets privilege
would need to be dismissed. This would mean abandoning the practice of
deciding cases on the basis of evidence-the unprivileged evidence and

136. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted,
586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 960 (dismissing the government‘s argument when it tried to assert hypothetical claims
that had not yet been considered by the court).
139. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007). For a description of a Bevins action,
see supra note 122.
140. Id.
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privileged-but-dispositive evidence-in favor of a system of conjecture.141

Also, when issuing its remand orders to the district court, the D.C.
Court of Appeals instructed that under the Reynolds framework
dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate only if (1) the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case without the offending evidence or (2) the
defendant‘s valid defense is obscured to the point that the trier of fact is
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion.142 The D.C. court, therefore,
correctly understood that as an evidentiary privilege, the appropriate role
of the appeals court in state secret cases is to allow district courts to
consider the facts and evidence. This approach, which was advocated
by the dissent in Mohamed, was not accepted by the Ninth Circuit‘s
majority, which misapplied the evidentiary privilege by refusing to
remand for a consideration of whether Jeppesen‘s valid defense was
barred by state secrets.
El-Masri is one of the few cases where the court acknowledged it was
dismissing a case on the pleadings based on hypothetical defenses.143
However, in that case the Fourth Circuit contended that any defense
would have to involve state secrets because state secrets were so central
to the litigation and concerned its very subject matter. This argument
was expressly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed.144
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly permitted the dismissal of
plaintiff‘s complaint in Mohamed because the possibility of merely
hypothetical defenses is not appropriate under the Reynolds framework
and no valid defense was ever advanced by the defendants.
D. Dismissal at the Outset Is Against Policy Reasons and Is Contrary to
Other Countries’ Interpretations of State Secrets Privileges.
Since the emergence of the state secrets doctrine, first following the
Aaron Burr case in 1807, and then formally in Totten v. U.S., a critical
question has remained about how best to balance protecting the
141. Id. at 150–151.
142. Id. at 154.
143. Id. at 149 (citing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007)) (noting that
any valid defense that the defendants‘ might raise would involve privileged information and would,
therefore, dismiss the need to consider particular defenses).
144. Id.
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government‘s interest while providing litigants fair and open access to
justice. Courts began interpreting Reynolds to mean that secret
information should be walled off from non-secret information and cases
should ordinarily not be dismissed at the outset because, as a public
policy matter, litigants deserve their day in court.145 Indeed, since
Totten was decided 150 years ago there has only been one other concrete
example of the U.S. Supreme Court dismissing a case at the outset based
on its very subject matter—Tenet.146
The reasons why outright dismissal of a suit without a discussion of
its merits is disfavored by courts are clear. These reasons were
articulated by the majority in Mohamed: (1) that outright dismissal is
rarely applied, and the parameters for it are not clearly defined; (2) that
the state secrets doctrine is judge-made and has extremely harsh
consequences; and (3) that conducting a more detailed analysis will tend
to improve the accuracy, transparency and legitimacy of the
proceedings.147
Dismissing a suit at the pleadings is a drastic measure for the reasons
stated above. Dismissal was particularly drastic in Mohamed because of
the ongoing constitutional issues raised by the extraordinary rendition
program.
When the D.C. district court was considering whether to dismiss a
wiretapping case at the pleadings, one of the reasons the court rejected
the government‘s argument was because of the pervasive constitutional
claims present in that case.148 As that court stated, no case dismissed at
the pleadings because of its subject matter has ever involved
―widespread violations of individual constitutional rights.‖ 149 The types
of cases that had been dismissed at the outset included highly technical
subject matter and claims involving contract disputes over covert
espionage. However, as that court noted, the issues in that suit involved

145. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
146. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). To
reiterate an earlier discussion, some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have held that Weinberger was a third
example of a case decided under Totten. That, however, is not necessarily true, and the Court‘s
discussion of state secrets in that case was limited to dicta.
147. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010).
148. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
149. Id.
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such significant constitutional questions that, as a matter of public
policy, attempts should be made for the case to proceed.150
This way of thinking—to grant evidentiary privileges but not absolute
immunity to the government—is precisely in line with how many other
democratic nations view the state secrets privilege.151 Most countries
now tend to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the state‘s
interest is so pivotal that immunity should be granted, or whether the
court can, in pursuit of justice and the public interest, allow the suit to
proceed without the offending information.152
In Spain, for example, plaintiffs who brought a claim after their
family members were killed for suspected terrorism were allowed to
proceed to trial despite the government‘s protest. Using a balancing
test, the Spanish court determined that the plaintiffs‘ interests were more
important than government‘s right to its confidential papers.153 The
court concluded, ―Constitutional guarantees of the right to obtain
effective protection from judges, and certainty that the rule of law shall
prevail, should take precedence over the state‘s security interests.‖154
Israeli courts considering a similar case to Mohamed—one that
concerned how the Israeli government was interrogating potential terror
suspects—also reached the conclusion that the state secrets privilege
was insufficient to deny the plaintiffs their day in court over their
constitutional claims.155 The Israeli court reasoned that while protecting
state secrets was critical, Israel should not be permitted to ―consign its
fight against terrorism to the twilight shadows of the law.‖156
These nations‘ practices have demonstrated that it is possible to
150. Id. at 993–994.
151. Nicole Hallett, Protecting National Security or Covering Up Malfeasance: The Modern State
Secrets Privilege and Its Alternatives, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 82 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/01/hallett.html (summarizing how other countries view the state secrets
privilege, and concluding that while the U.S. views the privilege as an absolute immunity to protect
privileged information, most countries tend to balance the need to guard sensitive information with the
importance of safeguarding constitutional rights).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Constitucion C.E. art. 24, cl. 1 (Spain), translated in The Kingdom of Spain:
Constitution, in XVII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Rainer
Grote eds., 2007)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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protect the government‘s secrets, carefully seal off protected documents,
and still allow litigants to seek their day in court. Ensuring that the
government is responsible for its actions is precisely the way other
courts in other nations have dealt with the state secrets privilege, and
many Americans advocate this approach as well. As previously noted,
Congressional hearings, including legislation to end extraordinary
rendition, have emerged in recent years.157 Earlier this year, a New York
Times editorial on Mohamed stated, ―The state secrets privilege is so
blinding and powerful that it should be invoked only when the most
grave national security matters are at stake. It should not be used to
defend against allegations that if true, would be ‗gross violations of the
norms of international law.‘‖158 This sound public policy is yet another
reason why Mohamed was incorrectly decided and why the invocation
of state secrets should not have led to dismissal at the pleadings in this
case.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout America‘s history, there has been tension between the
conflicting goals of security and liberty. The terrorist attacks on
September 11 brought this tension to the forefront. As practices that
once had been rare grew more common, the perceived need to shield
those practices from scrutiny grew. Extraordinary rendition is one such
practice. While it doubtlessly has contributed to the security of the
United States, it is impossible to weigh whether those benefits outweigh
the moral and human costs it has imposed on those who fall subject to it.
Despite the government‘s official acknowledgment of extraordinary
rendition, it is considered a state secret and prevents litigants from
redressing wrongs in court. The state secrets doctrine has existed for
over 200 years, and it has an important role in securing our safety and
ensuring that state secrets are not revealed. The doctrine was created in
recognition of the legitimate need to protect certain secret information; it
was never intended to protect unconstitutional practices from judicial
157. Members of Congress, such as Rep. Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Sen. Patrick Leahy of
Vermont, have in recent years introduced legislation that would prohibit the government‘s use of
extraordinary rendition.
158. Editorial, Torture Is a Crime, Not a Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A30.
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scrutiny.
While courts need to be conscientious about protecting state secrets,
in only extreme circumstances should constitutional claims be barred in
the name of national security. The United States has held true to this
ideal by preferring the Reynolds‘ flexible balancing test to Totten‘s total
bar to litigation.
It was under that general framework that the Ninth Circuit‘s threejudge panel decided Mohamed v. Jeppesen and correctly concluded that
the Reynolds test did not allow for complete dismissal of the suit at the
pleadings stage. The en banc reversal was an overbroad reading of
Reynolds. The decision was issued despite the fact that the defendants
never filed an answer explaining their inability to respond and despite
the fact that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case without
offending evidence. By conflating Totten and Reynolds, and by granting
dismissal so early in the litigation process, the Ninth Circuit turned an
evidentiary privilege into an immunity doctrine.
There is no doubt that some of the evidence either plaintiff or
defendant would require in Mohamed was restricted due to the state
secrets privilege. However, the dissent‘s view—that the case should
have been remanded to consider if the plaintiff‘s case could proceed—
was the better approach.
While there are, to be sure, state secrets involved in extraordinary
rendition cases, the existence and practice of extraordinary rendition is
not a secret. The Ninth‘s Circuit‘s Mohamed decision incorrectly
applied the Reynolds test by allowing dismissal at the pleading stage
without any showing that the case involved actual state secrets. The
Ninth Circuit did not fulfill its responsibility to engage in judicial
scrutiny of allegedly unconstitutional acts by allowing the government
to plea their way to immunity.
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